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THE FACE VALUE OF ARGUMENTS WITH AND WITHOUT MANIPULATION∗
By Mike Felgenhauer and Fangya Xu1
Brunel University London, UK; University of Reading, UK
A sender wishes to persuade a receiver with a (surprising) result that challenges the prior belief. The result
stems either from sequential private experimentation or manipulation. The incentive to experiment and to ma-
nipulate depends on the quality threshold for persuasion. Higher thresholds make it harder to find a surprising
outcome via experimentation and may encourage manipulation. Suppose there are observable nonmanipula-
ble and manipulable research methods. For the decision quality, the quality threshold for persuasion for non-
manipulable methods should be higher than for manipulable methods. We discuss philosophy of science impli-
cations, such as field contingent quality standards and P-value adjustments.
1. introduction
Many proposals for raising hurdles to the publication of experimental results, as in Ben-
jamin et al. (2018), ignore the effect that such proposals will have on experimenter behavior.
Higher quality requirements could discourage potentially valuable experimentation and
encourage manipulation. The net effect could be to lower the value of submitted papers.
Suppose a researcher (sender) can sequentially run private experiments and knows that if
he reveals a surprising outcome that goes against the prior belief, then an editor (receiver)
publishes this outcome. The researcher cares about publication, though less so if the publica-
tion is a result of a false positive. The editor wants to make the correct decision. The sender
can also privately manipulate to achieve the desired outcome. The difference between manip-
ulation and experimentation is that manipulation produces an outcome that is unrelated to an
(unknown) decision-relevant state of the world, whereas an experiment yields an informative
outcome. Manipulation is costly to the sender. In practice, manipulation costs can result from
expected punishment costs and they depend on the research method. For example, manipulat-
ing privately collected data for a regression can hardly be detected and expected punishment
costs are low. If a regression is run on publicly available data instead, then manipulation is
easier to detect and expected punishment costs should be higher.
We study how the face value of the evidence required for publication affects the sender’s
behavior and the quality of the publication process. The face value of a revealed outcome
corresponds to the precision of an experiment that can generate this outcome.2 For exam-
ple, when reviewing a paper containing a regression, the editor can assess the quality of the
regression in the manuscript (i) conditional on this regression being run on nonmanipulated
data and (ii) conditional on this specification being the only regression run. The face value
∗Manuscript received February 2019; revised June 2020.
1 Please address correspondence to: Mike Felgenhauer, Brunel University London, Marie Jahoda, Uxbridge, UB8
3PH, UK. E-mail: mike.felgenhauer@brunel.ac.uk.
2 Formally, an experiment’s precision is the probability with which its outcome correctly predicts the state of the
world. For a nonmanipulable research method the face value of the revealed outcome is equal to the precision of
the experiment that generated this outcome. For a manipulable method the revealed outcome may either stem from
an experiment with a certain precision or from manipulation, which pretends that it stems from an experiment with
this precision. For a manipulable research method the face value of a revealed outcome is equal to this (actual or
faked) precision.
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of any revealed outcome is observable, by reading the manuscript, but whether the revealed
outcome stems from an experiment or manipulation is not observable. We assume that the
sender can only run experiments with the face value that is required for publication and that
the receiver only publishes a surprising outcome with this face value.3
The article characterizes the face value requirement for publication that maximizes the
quality of the receiver’s decision. We find that the decision quality may not be maximized with
a demanding high face value. High-quality requirements make it hard to find a surprising re-
sult that goes against the prior belief via experimentation. Not experimenting or manipulation
may then be more attractive for the sender.
We find that an increase of the face value may encourage a switch from experimentation
to manipulation or vice versa. In spite of this ambiguity, our major result shows that the face
value requirements for manipulable research methods should be weakly below those for non-
manipulable methods.4 In order to illustrate the intuition, suppose that manipulation costs are
sufficiently low such that manipulation at the outset is optimal for the sender at the face value
that maximizes the decision quality for nonmanipulable outcomes. The question is how the
face value can be adjusted to make informative experimentation more attractive than uninfor-
mative manipulation. If the sender’s benefit from experimentation decreases in the face value,
for example, because he opportunistically cares more for a favorable decision than about the
state of the world, then experimenting becomes more profitable if the face value is reduced:
With a lower face value it is more likely to obtain a surprising experimental outcome by
chance that can be used for persuasion. If the sender’s benefit from experimentation increases
in the face value instead, for example, because he cares more about the right decision, then
the face value should be as high as possible for nonmanipulable outcomes. Increasing the face
value for manipulable outcomes in order to encourage experimentation is then not possible.
We argue that there should be different quality standards in scientific fields that use differ-
ent research methods: The decision quality maximizing publication standards should depend
on experimentation and manipulation costs associated with these methods. We also argue
that a reduction of the default P-value threshold for statistical significance for claims of new
discoveries, as proposed by 72 authors in Benjamin et al. (2018), may deteriorate the quality
of the publication process by increasing the number of published manipulated articles.
2. literature
This article is part of the persuasion literature in which a sender discloses information to a
receiver who then makes a decision that affects the sender’s well-being (e.g., Jovanovic, 1982;
Milgrom and Roberts, 1986; Glazer and Rubinstein, 2001; Dzuida, 2011). The article belongs
to a branch of this literature that combines persuasion with information acquisition via exper-
imentation.5 Many of these papers study public experimentation, where the receiver observes
the experimentation history (e.g., Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011; Henry and Ottaviani, 2019).
Henry and Ottaviani (2019) find that it may be in the receiver’s interest to commit to a low
approval standard to achieve desirable stopping behavior of the sender. This is related to our
point that a too challenging face value requirement for persuasion may deter experimentation
and encourage manipulation. Manipulation is not considered in Henry and Ottaviani (2019).
3 It can be shown that the results are not affected if the receiver sets the face value requirement and the sender
makes history-dependent precision choices.
4 The research method is observable (by reading the manuscript). A method can be viewed as nonmanipulable if
manipulation costs are sufficiently high such that manipulation does not occur at any face value. For a manipulable
method, manipulation occurs for some face values. Many papers in the literature assume nonmanipulable methods
and we consider them as an interesting benchmark.
5 The article relates to strategic experimentation as in Rothchild (1974), Aghion, et al. (1991), Bolton and Harris
(1990), Keller, et al. (2005), and Rosenberg, et al. (2007). A survey on these “bandit problems” is Bergemann and
Välimäki (2008). Experimentation is also studied in the literature on the classical problem of sequential analysis (as
in Wald, 1947; Moscarini and Smith, 2001).
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Other contributions, as this article, focus on private experimentation, where the receiver
cannot observe the experimentation history (e.g., Brocas and Carillo, 2007; Henry, 2009;
Felgenhauer and Schulte, 2014; Felgenhauer and Loerke, 2017). Private experimentation with
selective information revelation is a natural assumption for logical arguments or a regres-
sion analysis. Henry (2009) and Brocas and Carillo (2007) study settings where the receiver
knows or deduces the number of the sender’s experiments. Skeptical beliefs as in Milgrom and
Roberts (1986) induce unravelling and the receiver obtains access to the same information
as under public experimentation. If private experimentation is sequential instead, that is, the
decision to continue experimenting is history dependent (as in Celik, 2003; Felgenhauer and
Schulte, 2014; Felgenhauer and Loerke, 2017; and here), then the receiver in general cannot
deduce the actual number of experiments, even though she anticipates the experimentation
plan.6 Skeptical beliefs are not always helpful and, in general, communication is not fully re-
vealing. Most closely related are Felgenhauer and Schulte (2014) and Felgenhauer and Loerke
(2017), in the following FS and FL, respectively.
FS investigate nonmanipulable arguments that are generated via sequential private exper-
imentation. They study how many arguments with a given face value are used for persua-
sion. In an application they rationalize restrictions on scientific methods. This article studies
research methods where manipulation is possible. It characterizes how the quality of the
receiver’s decision depends on the face value required for persuasion. In contrast to FS, the
focus here is on the relation between experimentation and manipulation and a comparison of
different types of research methods.
FL build on FS and endogenize the design of the experiments.7 FL determine the set of
equilibria with persuasion under private experimentation that are not Pareto dominated.
These equilibria differ regarding the precision of the experiments. For expositional conve-
nience, this article instead assumes that the face value required for persuasion can be set. It
addresses the normative question what the face value requirement should be for different
research methods.
Manipulation is related to the cheap talk literature (e.g., Crawford and Sobel, 1982), as a
manipulated outcome does not have an inherent meaning. Strulovici (2017) studies the impact
of compensation schemes on experimentation and manipulation, that is, manipulable methods
in our sense. We instead derive face value requirements for persuasion that maximize the
decision quality. Felgenhauer and Xu (2019) extend and complement this article by studying
the informative content of manipulable results contingent on the state of the debate.
Finally, this article is related to the economic literature on academic research (e.g., Stern,
2004; Aghion et al., 2008; Lewis and Ottaviani, 2008; Olszewski and Sandroni, 2011) and the
philosophy of science (e.g., Popper, 1959; Kuhn, 1970).
3. assumptions
There is a state of the world ω ∈ , with  = {ω1, ω2}. The ex ante probability that the state
is ω1 is prob{ω = ω1} = μ0, with μ0 ∈ (0, 1/2]. There is a sender and a receiver. The receiver
chooses action a ∈ A, with A = {a1, a2}.
6 Non–history-dependent experimentation implies a commitment problem. If the sender commits to a number of
experiments, but finds too many adverse outcomes, then he anticipates that persuasion is impossible by running the
final experiments. As experimentation is private, it is unclear why he should run the remaining costly experiments.
Baliga and Ely (2016) on the other hand investigate a repeated receiver–sender framework where the receiver has to
make history-dependent decisions.
7 Felgenhauer (2019) introduces costly verification and shows that communication breaks down under public exper-
imentation, but it is possible under private experimentation.
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3.1. Sender’s Gross Payoff. The sender obtains gross utility
ω = ω1 ω = ω2
a = a1 1 θ
a = a2 0 0
with θ ∈ [0, 1] being his type.8 The sender prefers action a1 regardless of the state. However, if
θ < 1 and the state is ω2, then he does not benefit from a1 as much as in state ω1. In an aca-
demic context θ could be interpreted as a researcher’s integrity. If θ = 1, then he values a pub-
lication (a = a1) the same regardless of whether the result is “true” or “false”, that is, regard-
less of whether it reflects the state. If θ < 1, then he feels less comfortable with a publication
if the published outcome is “false” (ω = ω2) than if the outcome is “true” (ω = ω1).9 θ may
depend on the career stage and affiliation of the researcher, as publication pressure depends
on both.
3.2. Experimentation, Manipulation, and Messages. The sender has access to an experi-
mentation technology that can generate signals about ω. He can run as many experiments as
desired. The outcome of an experiment τ is στ ∈ {s1, s2}. s1 is called a “positive outcome” and
s2 an “adverse outcome.” The precision of each experiment that the sender may run is π , with
π = prob{στ = si | ω = ωi} and π ∈ (1/2, 1] for all i ∈ {1, 2}. The experimentation technology
is, thus, symmetric in the sense that the probability that the outcome of an experiment cor-
rectly predicts the state is the same in both states. All experiments have the same precision.
Let ht = {σ j} j=1,...,t be an experimentation history that the sender observes and which con-
tains the outcomes of t experiments and let h0 = ∅ be the history if no experiment is run.
The posterior probability that the state is ω1 given some history ht is prob{ω = ω1 | ht}. Let
μt be the posterior prob{ω = ω1 | ht} if ht exclusively contains t adverse outcomes. Running
an experiment costs cE > 0. Experimentation costs have to be subtracted from the sender’s
gross payoff.
The sender sends a message m ∈ {s1, s2,∅}. Given history ht it is feasible to send m = si if
σ j = si for some σ j ∈ ht . The sender may also manipulate at costs cM > 0. If the sender manip-
ulates, then he creates an outcome si that is not informative regarding ω and it is feasible to
send message m = si. Manipulation is not observable.
We exclude parameters for which the sender prefers doing nothing to experimentation for
all π , which is the case if experimentation costs are too high.10
Assumption A. Assume cE ≤ max(μ0/2 + (1 − μ0)θ/2, μ0).
The sender’s behavior does not depend on π if cE > max(μ0/2 + (1 − μ0)θ/2, μ0).
3.3. Receiver Behavior and Decision Quality. We assume a nonstrategic receiver who
chooses a1 if she observes message m = s1 with face value π and a2 otherwise. The observable
face value π is, thus, also a quality requirement for persuasion. The objective is to determine
the face value requirements for persuasion (considered as exogenous by the players, for
8 The utility from choosing a particular action also depends on the state in Herresthal (2017), who compares public
and private experimentation (without manipulation).
9 We do not consider θ < 0, in which case the researcher would be better off without publishing his results a = a2 if
they are false ω = ω2 compared to publishing them. This reduces the number of case distinctions. Such types do not
manipulate if they know that ω = ω2, however, they may manipulate if there is uncertainty regarding the state.
10 Assumption A ensures that this is the case by excluding parameters for which inequality (2) below is reversed at
π = 1/2 and in addition at π = 1. This assumption is not critical for the results.
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simplicity) that maximize the decision quality. Decision quality is defined as the probability
that the receiver’s action matches the state, prob{ai = ωi} ≡ prob{ω = ω1}prob{m = s1 | ω =
ω1} + prob{ω = ω2}prob{m = s1 | ω = ω2}. Denote the face value that maximizes the decision
quality for nonmanipulable methods by πE and the face value that maximizes the decision
quality for manipulable methods by πM.
Maximizing the decision quality corresponds to maximizing the receiver’s expected utility if
she has the following ex post utility:
ω = ω1 ω = ω2
a = a1 1 0
a = a2 0 1.
The source of conflict between the players is that the receiver prefers the “correct” deci-
sion not to publish when the state is ω2 and the sender prefers publication in this state. As
μ0 ∈ (0, 1/2], state ω1 is considered as less likely than ω2. A positive experimental outcome is
thus also less likely (or more “surprising” ) than an adverse outcome. The receiver’s decision
rule only to publish a positive outcome reflects that an editor may be more willing to publish a
surprising result that goes against the prior.
3.4. Timing. The sender moves first. For each experimentation history ht he makes the
history-dependent choice to run a further experiment or to stop experimenting.11 If he stops
experimenting at ht , then he chooses whether to manipulate. Then, the sender sends message
m. Finally, the receiver chooses a.
4. one-shot experimentation
We now illustrate key effects if the sender can run at most one experiment and only manip-
ulate at the outset. We discuss πE and πM and show that πM ≤ πE .
4.1. Nonmanipulable Methods. The decision quality prob{ai = ωi} depends on whether the
sender experiments or not. If the receiver’s decision is based on an experimental outcome,
then prob{ai = ωi} = π and the decision quality increases in π . If there is no experiment
and the receiver chooses against the sender a2, then prob{ai = ωi} = 1 − μ0. The experiment
should only be run if π ≥ 1 − μ0.
The sender’s expected utility from running one experiment is EU 1 = μ0π + (1 − μ0)(1 −
π )θ − cE and he experiments if his participation constraint EU 1 ≥ 0 is satisfied.
Observation 1. EU 1 decreases in π if θ ≥ μ01−μ0 and it increases otherwise.
Increasing an experiment’s precision π makes it more likely that publication occurs in the
less likely state ω1, which the sender desires, but makes it less likely that it occurs in the more
likely state ω2, which he also desires at θ . Thus, if θ is high or if ω2 is very likely (μ0 is low),
increasing π is detrimental to the sender. Otherwise, the sender benefits from an increase of
π . A sender with a high θ (≥ μ01−μ0 ) can be interpreted as opportunistic. A sender with a low
θ (< μ01−μ0 ) can be viewed as sincere. The players’ preferences are misaligned if the sender is
opportunistic and they are aligned if he is sincere.
The decision quality is maximized at πE = 1 if experimentation costs are sufficiently low
such that the sender’s participation constraint EU 1 ≥ 0 is satisfied at πE = 1 (regardless of
11 If the sender never stops experimenting, then his gross payoff is zero.
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Figure 1
manipulation at all π with a sincere sender
whether he is opportunistic or sincere). This is the case if μ0 ≥ cE . Suppose in the following
μ0 < cE .
Consider a sincere sender, whose EU 1 increases in π . If his participation constraint is
violated at π = 1 (which is the case if μ0 < cE), then it is also violated at all lower π . Pa-
rameters for which the sender does not experiment for all π are excluded by Assumption A.
Assumption A and μ0 < cE , therefore, imply that the sender has to be opportunistic.
Consider an opportunistic sender, whose EU 1 decreases in π . In the set of π for
which EU 1 ≥ 0 (the precisions for which the sender experiments), the decision quality
prob{ai = ωi} = π is maximized at the π where the participation constraint is binding. We
have EU 1 = 0 at π = cE−(1−μ0 )θ
μ0−(1−μ0 )θ . But should the receiver’s decision be based on an experi-
ment with this precision? The prior is against the sender and this π may be very low. The
decision quality if there is an experiment is only higher than the decision quality without an
experiment if π ≥ 1 − μ0. Therefore, we have πE = cE−(1−μ0 )θμ0−(1−μ0 )θ if
cE−(1−μ0 )θ
μ0−(1−μ0 )θ ≥ 1 − μ0. Oth-
erwise, experimentation should be deterred with a high πE ∈ ( cE−(1−μ0 )θμ0−(1−μ0 )θ , 1] such that the
participation constraint is violated.
The more opportunistic the sender (higher θ), the higher is πE = cE−(1−μ0 )θμ0−(1−μ0 )θ , as he then
has a greater benefit from persuasion and is indifferent between experimentation and not
experimenting at a higher π . Furthermore, πE = cE−(1−μ0 )θμ0−(1−μ0 )θ increases in μ0 (the less surprising
a positive outcome): A higher μ0 increases EU 1, treating πE as a parameter, which relaxes the
participation constraint. Only an increase of πE can make it binding again for an opportunistic
sender.12
4.2. Manipulable Methods. The sender’s expected utility from manipulation is
EU M = μ0 + (1 − μ0)θ − cM. If manipulation costs cM are sufficiently high such that
EU M ≤ μ0πE + (1 − μ0)(1 − πE )θ − cE , then we have πM = πE . Suppose manipulation is
optimal for the sender at πE . Let us check whether and how a change of π may encourage a
switch to informative experimentation.
Consider a sincere sender, whose EU 1 increases in π . If manipulation is optimal at πE = 1,
then there is no π ∈ (1/2, 1) that encourages experimentation, as illustrated in Figure 1.
Next, consider an opportunistic sender and suppose that manipulation is not optimal for
all π . Since EU 1 decreases in π for an opportunistic sender, only a reduction of π may
12 dπE
dθ = (cE−μ0 )(1−μ0 )(μ0−θ+θμ0 )2 > 0, as μ0 < cE .
dπE
dμ0
= θ (1−cE )−cE
(μ0−θ+θμ0 )2
≥ 0: According to Assumption A we have cE ≤
max(μ0/2 + (1 − μ0)θ/2, μ0). As μ0 < cE , this simplifies to cE ≤ μ0/2 + (1 − μ0)θ/2 ⇔ θ ≥ 2cE−μ01−μ0 . Substituting
θ ≥ 2cE−μ01−μ0 into the numerator of
dπE
dμ0
yields θ (1 − cE ) − cE ≥ 2cE−μ01−μ0 (1 − cE ) − cE =
(1−2cE )(cE−μ0 )
1−μ0 ≥ 0, as cE ≤
1/2 by Assumption A and μ0 < cE .
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Figure 2
πM < πE with an opportunistic sender
induce experimentation. A lower precision increases the chance to obtain a positive outcome
from an experiment given the adverse prior, but the sender’s benefit from manipulation does
not depend on π . Therefore, πM < πE . The decision quality is maximized at the π that solves
EU M = EU 1, that is, at πM = μ0+cE−cMμ0−θ (1−μ0 ) .
In Figure 2, higher manipulation costs shift EU M downward and the intersection of EU M
and EU 1 moves right. Thus, the decision quality maximizing face value requirement for
persuasion increases in manipulation costs.
Analogous to the previous section, the receiver would be best off by choosing against the
sender if the sender only experiments at π that are too low given the adverse prior belief or if
cM are sufficiently low such that EU M > EU 1 for all π .
5. sequential experimentation and manipulation
We now show πM ≤ πE if there are no restrictions on the number of experiments and with
history-dependent experimentation and manipulation choices.
5.1. Nonmanipulable Methods.
5.1.1. Sender behavior. Sequential rationality implies that the sender stops experimenting
if he faces some experimentation history ht that contains a positive outcome. He has then
found persuasive evidence and induces his preferred decision a1 by sending message m = s1.
It may be sequentially rational to continue experimenting if the history contains exclusively
adverse outcomes. Define EU 1t as the sender’s continuation utility at history ht from running
one further experiment and then stopping after either outcome. Consider any history ht that
contains exclusively adverse outcomes. Stopping unsuccessfully at ht , yielding decision a2, is
sequentially rational if
EU 1t = μtπ + (1 − μt )(1 − π )θ − cE < 0,(1)
with μt = μ0(1−π )
t
μ0(1−π )t+(1−μ0 )π t . With each additional adverse outcome, the posterior that the state
is ω1 decreases. If this posterior decreases, then the probability to obtain a positive outcome
with the next experiment also decreases, which makes it less attractive to experiment further.
The sender stops experimenting at the lowest t for which the inequality holds. Denote the
number of adverse outcomes until the sender stops experimenting unsuccessfully by TE . The
sender never stops experimenting unsuccessfully if inequality (1) is violated at the worst pos-
terior from the sender’s perspective, that is, if the posterior is zero. The sender does not ex-
periment at all (TE = 0) if running a single experiment at the prior belief is worse than not
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experimenting, that is, for parameters for which EU 10 < 0. TE is strictly positive and finite for
all other parameters. In this case information about the state of the world is generated.13
We now study how the sender’s behavior depends on π . The sender’s continuation utility
from running one more experiment and then stopping after either outcome is described in
(1). Lemma 1 finds that TE decreases in π (conditional on TE ≥ 1) as an increase of π lowers
EU 1t . In (1), the positive effect of a higher π in the unlikely state ω1 is overcompensated by
the adverse reduction of the posterior μt and the negative effect in the likely state ω2.14
Lemma 1. Consider parameters such that TE ≥ 1. (i) TE weakly decreases in π . (ii) TE = 1 if
π is sufficiently high.
The reduction of excessive experimentation that is implied by a higher π suggests that
the πE that maximizes the decision quality in the one-shot experimentation model remains
optimal if more experiments are possible. We confirm this intuition below.
5.1.2. The decision quality. We now study the face values that maximize the decision qual-
ity prob{ai = ωi}. Conditional on experimentation being sequentially rational, Lemma 2 finds
that an increase of π has a positive impact on the decision quality. This is due to the positive
direct effect of a higher π and the positive indirect effect via a reduction of excessive private
experimentation according to Lemma 1.
Lemma 2. Consider an increase of the face value π and a sender that runs at least one exper-
iment before and after the increase of π . The decision quality prob{ai = ωi} weakly increases in
π .
Lemmas 1 and 2 imply that prob{ai = ωi} is greater for each high π for which TE = 1 is
sequentially rational than for any low π for which TE > 1 is sequentially rational. For the face
values for which TE = 1 is sequentially rational, we have that prob{ai = ωi} also increases in
π . Running a single experiment is better for the sender than not experimenting if
μ0π + (1 − μ0)(1 − π )θ − cE ≥ 0,(2)
which corresponds to the participation constraint under one-shot experimentation.
We now argue that the sender does not want to continue experimenting upon observing
an adverse outcome of the first experiment with precision πE under one-shot experimenta-
tion. It then follows that the face values that maximize the decision quality under sequential
experimentation are the same as under one-shot experimentation.
If πE = 1 under one-shot experimentation, then the sender here does not run more than
one experiment, as an adverse outcome confirms the adverse state with certainty and it is
impossible to obtain a positive outcome by chance. If πE < 1 under one-shot experimenta-
tion, then the participation constraint, which is analogous to inequality (2 ) here, is binding.
The sender prefers to stop experimenting after observing an adverse outcome of an experi-
ment with πE < 1, as he is indifferent to run an experiment at the more favorable prior belief.
Proposition 1 directly follows.
13 Wald (1947) discusses a statistician’s (“sender’s” ) decision function, which implies when to stop experiment-
ing. Here, the sender’s decision function is in addition endogenously influenced by the incentives provided by the re-
ceiver’s decision rule (only to publish a positive outcome) and the information structure (adverse outcomes can be
hidden).
14 Note that the prior μ0 does not depend on π , whereas posterior μt deteriorates if π increases. As there is no
detrimental reduction of μ0 in response to an increase of π , we may have that EU10 increases in π . EU
1
t instead de-
creases in π if t > 0, which yields Lemma 1.
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Proposition 1. The face value πE that maximizes the decision quality prob{ai = ωi} is (i)
πE = 1 if μ0 ≥ cE, (ii) πE = cE−(1−μ0 )θμ0−(1−μ0 )θ < 1 if μ0 < cE and
cE−(1−μ0 )θ
μ0−(1−μ0 )θ ≥ 1 − μ0, and (iii) πE ∈
( cE−(1−μ0 )θ
μ0−(1−μ0 )θ , 1] if μ0 < cE and
cE−(1−μ0 )θ
μ0−(1−μ0 )θ < 1 − μ0. In cases (i) and (ii) a single experiment is run
and the decision quality is prob{ai = ωi} = πE. In case (iii) there is no experimentation and the
decision quality is prob{ai = ωi} = 1 − μ0.
Under the conditions of Proposition 1 (ii) and (iii), an opportunistic sender type may be
deterred from running experiments if the face value is too high. It then becomes too hard to
find a positive outcome with a high quality experiment given the unfavorable prior belief to
justify experimentation costs.
5.2. Manipulable Methods.
5.2.1. Sender behavior. If manipulation is possible, then the sender may run experiments
and eventually manipulate. Suppose the sender observes a history ht containing exclusively
adverse outcomes. The continuation utility from manipulation at history ht is
EU Mt ≡ μt + (1 − μt )θ − cM,(3)
which decreases in the number of adverse outcomes that history ht contains.
The sender does not manipulate if for all t ≤ TE the continuation utility from manipulation
EU Mt is below the continuation utility EU
C
t from experimenting without eventual manipula-
tion. Otherwise, eventual manipulation occurs if the sender does not find a positive outcome
by experimentation. Denote by TM the number of adverse outcomes after which such a sender
type manipulates.15 If TM = 0, then this type manipulates at the outset. Manipulation occurs if
cM is sufficiently low.
Let us again study how the sender’s behavior depends on π .
Proposition 2. In response to an increase of π , there exist parameters such that a type
switches from
(i) eventual manipulation to experimenting with eventual unsuccessful stopping;
(ii) experimenting with eventual unsuccessful stopping to eventual manipulation.
The sender’s incentive to manipulate at a given μt does not depend on π . The incentive
to run an additional experiment and then to stop after either outcome without manipulation
at a given μt may increase or decrease in π . In addition, an increase of π in general changes
the posterior where the sender stops experimenting via an adjustment of the experimentation
behavior and the change of the informative value of each outcome. Suppose, for example, that
the number of adverse outcomes is reduced from some t ′ to some t ′′. We may have μt ′ > μt ′′
(as each adverse outcome is more informative) or μt ′ < μt ′′ (as the number of adverse out-
comes is lower with t ′′). Both, the benefit from experimenting without manipulation and
the benefit from manipulation depend on μt , and parameters determine which option the
sender prefers.
5.2.2. The decision quality. The following observation confirms the intuition that manipu-
lation is detrimental for the decision quality:
Observation 2. Experimentation with a strictly positive and finite TE yields a higher
prob{ai = ωi} than manipulation.
15 In the Appendix we describe an algorithm for the derivation of EUCt and TM .
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We now compare the face value πE that maximizes the decision quality for nonmanipula-
ble outcomes with the face value πM that maximizes the decision quality if manipulation is
possible. Let manipulation costs cM be sufficiently low such that manipulation at the outset is
sequentially rational for the sender at πE .16 The argument for why πM ≤ πE now is analogous
to one-shot experimentation.
For parameters described in Proposition 1 (i), the sender may be opportunistic or sincere
and we have πE = 1. An increase of the face value is not possible and, thus, πM ≤ πE . For
parameters described in Proposition 1 (ii) and (iii), the sender is opportunistic and, conse-
quently, his ex ante benefit from running a single experiment without manipulation decreases
in the face value. Hence, informative experimentation may only become more attractive than
uninformative manipulation if the face value is reduced and it thereby becomes more likely to
find a surprising positive experimental outcome that goes against the adverse prior. It follows
that πM ≤ πE for the parameters in Proposition 1 (ii) and (iii).17 The next proposition, our
major result, follows.
Proposition 3. Consider any face value πE that maximizes prob{ai = ωi} for methods where
manipulation is not possible. Suppose that manipulation is possible and that manipulation is
optimal for the sender at πE. The sender may only be encouraged to experiment with eventual
unsuccessful stopping, which increases prob{ai = ωi}, by lowering the face value below πE.
In the Appendix we show that this result does not depend on our assumption that θ ≥ 0 and
also not on Assumption A.
A necessary condition for a strict increase of prob{ai = ωi} via a reduction of π below πE
(if manipulation occurs at πE) is that the sender is opportunistic (θ ≥ μ01−μ0 ). Such a reduction
can strictly increase prob{ai = ωi}, for example, if πE < 1 and if cM is such that the sender
just prefers manipulation at the outset: The sender’s expected utility from running a single
experiment with πE without manipulation is zero. Manipulating at the outset by assumption
(almost) yields the same expected utility. His continuation utility from manipulating after
observing an adverse outcome of an experiment with πE is strictly negative due to the worse
posterior. A decrease of π ex ante renders running a single experiment without manipulation
better than manipulation at the outset for an opportunistic sender. If the decrease of π is
sufficiently small, then the benefit from manipulating after observing an adverse outcome of
the experiment with the lower face value is still negative. Hence, such a decrease of π below
πE encourages experimentation without manipulation and strictly increases prob{ai = ωi}. It is
straightforward that πM < πE does not only hold for knife edge cases.
Consider the parameters in Proposition 3 and in addition suppose that experimentation
with unsuccessful stopping is sequentially rational for the sender for some face value. The face
value that maximizes prob{ai = ωi} is the highest π such that μtπ + (1 − μt )(1 − π )θ − cE ≥
μt + (1 − μt )θ − cM for all t ≤ TE , where μt and TE are functions of π .
5.3. Welfare. Suppose the receiver obtains utility 1 if her decision matches the state and
0 otherwise. Suppose that the sender is small in the sense that his utility has a negligible im-
pact on welfare. Welfare is then equal to the receiver’s expected utility, which is equal to the
16 The case where manipulation occurs after observing an adverse outcome is discussed in the proof of Proposi-
tion 3. Consider a πE , where the sender runs a single experiment under a nonmanipulable method. Eventual manipu-
lation occurs if cM < max{μ0(1 − πE ) + (1 − μ0)θπE + cE , μ1 + (1 − μ1)θ}, where μ1 is based on πE . Consider a πE ,
where the sender does not experiment under a nonmanipulable method. Manipulation occurs if cM < μ0 + (1 − μ0)θ .
If instead cM is sufficiently high such that eventual manipulation does not occur at πE , then πM = πE .
17 Note that for parameters in Proposition 1 (iii) no experimentation yields a higher prob{ai = ωi} than experimen-
tation with π ≤ cE−(1−μ0 )θ
μ0−(1−μ0 )θ . However, as noted above, no experimentation cannot be induced with any face value
for these parameters. It would yield a higher decision quality if the decision maker chose against the sender for any
face value.
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decision quality prob{ai = ωi}. The following proposition identifies circumstances where
welfare decreases in π .
Proposition 4. (i) Suppose the sender switches from experimenting with eventual unsuccess-
ful stopping to doing nothing in response to the increase of π . There is a threshold precision π̃
such that welfare decreases if the initial precision is π > π̃ .
(ii) Suppose manipulation is possible and the sender switches from experimenting with even-
tual unsuccessful stopping to eventual manipulation in response to the increase of π . Welfare
decreases in π .
In part (i), the increase of π decreases prob{ai = ωi} if the initial face value is sufficiently
high.18 If manipulation is possible (part (ii)), then there is the additional effect that an in-
crease of π may induce a switch from experimentation without manipulation to manipulation,
which lowers prob{ai = ωi}.
If a social planner can make the decisions, then she can obtain the welfare maximum (at
lowest costs) by running a single experiment with π = 1. Due to manipulation and strate-
gic experimentation, the highest face value π = 1 is not necessarily socially optimal if the
sender experiments.
6. application—philosophy of science aspects
For many arguments in science, sequential private experimentation with selective informa-
tion revelation is possible. For example, a researcher may privately run thought experiments
for a logical argument or he may privately run different specifications on nonmanipulated
data for an empirical argument. As argued in the introduction, manipulation is often possible
and manipulation costs depend on the research method.
In the tradition of our discipline and based on empirical findings by replication studies, we
think that incentives, such as publication-based rewards, matter for researcher behavior.19 For
example, the Reproducibility Project (Open Science Collaboration 2015) tried to replicate
the experimental results of 100 psychological studies published in three psychology journals.
The replication effects were half the magnitude of the effects in the original studies. Whereas
97% of the original studies had significant results, only 36% of the replications had signifi-
cant results. The Reproducibility Project suggests a substantial amount of excessive private
experimentation with selective information revelation and/or manipulation in science.
6.1. Field Contingent Quality Requirements. Our article argues that the optimal face value
depends on the scientific methods under consideration. In particular, it should depend on how
easily manipulation is possible. For example, if we are interested in the decision quality for
articles that go against the prior belief, then our analysis suggests that the optimal face value
for empirical arguments that are based on privately collected data is below the optimal face
value if the argument is based on publicly available data. Manipulating a logical deduction in
science also tends to be rather costly. Logic per se cannot be manipulated, but mistakes may
occur. An outsider cannot directly distinguish between an honest mistake and manipulation,
that is a “mistake on purpose,” that yields the desired conclusion. However, when a logical ar-
gument is released, then the flawed analysis becomes public and there is a decent chance that
18 The intuition regarding the threshold π̃ is as follows. If the initial precision is below π̃ and the sender experi-
ments, then it is likely that the wrong decision is made by chance. With the higher precision he does not experiment
and induces a = a2, where a prior μ0 < 1/2 suggests that this is the correct decision. If the initial precision is above π̃
instead and the sender experiments, then it is likely that the correct decision is made. This effect can be stronger than
the effect on the decision quality that inducing a = a2 has in response to an increased precision.
19 Brodeur, et al. (2016) examine the distribution of 50,000 statistical tests published in the AER, JPE, and QJE
and find evidence that researchers “inflate” the value of just-rejected tests by choosing significant specifications in or-
der to get their results published.
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the flaw is detected either by referees, an editor or the scientific community. This typically has
negative reputation effects regarding ability, skills etc., which suggest high manipulation costs.
6.2. P-Value Adjustment. Benjamin et al. (2018) propose to reduce the default P-value
threshold for statistical significance for claims of new discoveries from 0.05 to 0.005. In our
terminology this resembles an increase of the face value.20 They note that the rate of replica-
tion in recent replication projects in psychology and experimental economics is about twice as
high for initial studies with P < 0.005 relative to initial studies with 0.005 <P < 0.05.21 They
also study the gains of reducing the P-value following a set of statistical assumptions.
Investigating reproducibility for different thresholds using the same set of articles in or-
der to justify a higher face value is reasonable if the results of the Reproducibility Project
are mainly due to a statistical anomaly, but it is problematic if the results are mainly due to
scientific misconduct. Each face value triggers a behavioral response. Using the same set of
articles to study the reproducibility for different thresholds may underestimate the behav-
ioral response. According to our model, the impact of an increase of the face value on the
quality of published articles is ambiguous. Depending on parameters, the sender may switch
from eventual unsuccessful stopping to eventual manipulation or vice versa if the face value
increases. The quality of published articles may therefore go up or down. Our model suggests
that there are two risks from lowering the P -value threshold. First, the more sincere scientists
may be deterred from experimenting. Second, some scientists may switch from experimenting
to manipulation. With a threshold of 0.005, it becomes substantially harder to obtain surpris-
ing publishable results with honest scientific work and the incentive either not to experiment
or, perhaps more importantly, to eventually manipulate may become stronger.
6.3. Manipulation and Experimentation Costs. FS study the effect of experimentation costs
on the value of nonmanipulable methods. They use their findings to rationalize restrictions
on admissible scientific methods. They interpret higher experimentation costs as more re-
strictions. For example, it tends to be harder (more costly) to rationalize an economic effect
using the homo economicus assumption than allowing arbitrary utility functions. Lower costs
encourage excessive private experimentation. More restrictions may, therefore, improve the
value of scientific arguments.
In our model the relative size of experimentation and manipulation costs matters for the
value of manipulable methods. Low experimentation costs still encourage excessive exper-
imentation, which has a negative impact on the quality of publications. Suppose, however,
that a researcher type using a regression eventually manipulates his data for given exper-
imentation and manipulation costs. This type’s behavior is uninformative. A decrease of
experimentation costs, for example, due to faster computer hardware or less restrictions, tends
to make experimentation more attractive compared to manipulation. It is easy to construct
cases where such a type starts to generate information if experimentation costs are lowered.
As argued previously, there are scientific fields, such as psychology, where methods are used
where manipulation is easy. Adjusting experimentation costs, for example, via the level of re-
strictions of admissible methods, and manipulation costs could be used to improve the quality
of publications.
20 Our Bayesian model and the classical perspective are not identical. The face value in this article cannot
be directly translated into P-value, which is the calculated probability that the null hypothesis is true. However,
we abstract from these differences. In both cases manipulation and excessive private experimentation with selective
information revelation lower the real value of the analysis. If the required threshold of the P-value is lowered, the
precision requirement is increased, which has a similar effect as an increase of π in our model.
21 The authors note though that the behavior of the researchers may change in response to a new threshold and
that their behavior has to be monitored. On the other hand, if it were easy to monitor the behavior, then this could
have been done with the 0.05 threshold as well.
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7. conclusion
This article studies persuasion with endogenous information acquisition and selective in-
formation revelation. We introduce the option to manipulate into a framework where an
outcome may also be obtained by sequential private experimentation. We investigate how
changing the face value required for persuasion affects the sender’s behavior and its effect on
the decision quality.
We describe the sender’s behavior and derive the face value requirements for persuasion
that maximize the decision quality for nonmanipulable methods. Opportunistic sender types,
who do not worry much about persuasion with a false positive, may be deterred from infor-
mative experimentation if the face value requirements are too challenging. If the method is
manipulable instead, then an increase of the face value requirement may encourage a switch
from experimentation to manipulation or vice versa. Our major result shows that the face
value that maximizes the decision quality for manipulable methods is below the face value
that maximizes this quality for nonmanipulable methods.
We apply our analysis to scientific arguments. We find that increasing the face value re-
quired for publication may have a detrimental effect on the quality of the publication process,
in particular for scientific methods that rely on privately collected data. A higher face value
may, for example, make manipulation more attractive compared to experimentation. We are
sceptical regarding a P-value adjustment, as proposed in Benjamin et al. (2018), since it makes
it harder to find surprising publishable outcome with honest scientific work.
We conclude with a word of caution. Our result that the face value for manipulable meth-
ods should be unambiguously weakly lower than for nonmanipulable methods is model spe-
cific. In our view, we develop a reasonable intuition for why the face value should be lower for
manipulable methods. But even in our model we can identify parameters where an increase
of the face value from a suboptimal level induces a switch from manipulation to experimenta-
tion, as in Proposition 2 (i). Future research could explore potential limitations of this result.
appendix A
Proof of Lemma 1. The expected utility from running one further experiment at TE can be
written as EU 1TE (μTE−1, π ) =
μTE −1(1−π )
μTE −1(1−π )+(1−μTE −1 )π
π + (1−μTE −1 )π
μTE −1(1−π )+(1−μTE −1 )π
(1 − π )θ − cE , with




in π if μTE−1 is considered as a parameter that is not affected by the change of π . Step (2)
argues that EU 1TE increases in μTE−1for a given π . Step (3) uses steps (1) and (2) and shows
that EU 1TE decreases if π increases and there is a weak decrease of μTE−1.
(1) Suppose μTE−1 is a constant in EU
1
TE




(π+μTE −1−2πμTE −1 )
2 (μTE−1(1 − 2π ) + π2(2μTE−1 − 1)) < 0, since π > 1/2 and
μTE−1 < 1/2.




(3) Consider a marginal increase of π from π ′ to π ′′ that implies that μTE−1 weakly
decreases from μ′TE−1 to μ
′′








′). According to step (1) we have EU 1TE (μ
′′
TE−1, π




two inequalities imply EU 1TE (μ
′
TE−1, π




Proof of Lemma 2. We have prob{ai = ωi} = μ0(1 − (1 − π )TE ) + (1 − μ0)πTE . The proof
proceeds in 3 steps. Step (1) shows that prob{ai = ωi} increases in π if TE is not affected by the
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change of π . Step (2) shows that prob{ai = ωi} decreases in TE for a given π if TE ≥ 2.22 Step
(3) uses steps (1) and (2) and shows that the prob{ai = ωi} increases if π increases and there is
a discrete decrease of TE .
(1) Suppose that TE does not change if π is marginally increased. In this case
dprob{ai=ωi}
dπ =
TE ((1 − μ0)πTE−1 + μ0(1 − π )TE−1) > 0.
(2) Consider a discrete change of TE without changing π . In prob{ai = ωi} = μ0(1 −
(1 − π )TE ) + (1 − μ0)πTE , we have that (1 − (1 − π )TE ) increases in TE and πTE decreases
in TE . The decision quality prob{ai = ωi} is a convex combination of (1 − (1 − π )TE ) and πTE ,
with μ0 being the corresponding parameter. The critical case is the highest μ0, that is, μ0 =
1/2.23 In this case the decision quality simplifies to prob{ai = ωi} = 12 (1 − (1 − π )TE + πTE ) for
each TE . We have
1
2 (1 − (1 − π )TE + πTE )
= 12 (1 − (1 − π )TE−1 + π (1 − π )(1 − π )TE−2 + ππTE−1)
≤ 12 (1 − (1 − π )TE−1 + π (1 − π )πTE−2 + ππTE−1)
= 12 (1 − (1 − π )TE−1 + πTE−1),
where the inequality holds if TE ≥ 2, as π > 1 − π . Therefore, for a given π , we have that
prob{ai = ωi} increases if TE is decreased by 1, for all μ0 ∈ [0, 1/2].
(3) Suppose that π increases from π ′ to π ′′ and that TE decreases by 1 due to the
change of π . In the critical case with μ0 = 1/2 we have 12 (1 − (1 − π ′)TE + π ′TE ) < 12 (1 −
(1 − π ′′)TE + π ′′TE ) as shown in step (1). Furthermore, we have 12 (1 − (1 − π ′′)TE + π ′′TE ) ≤
1
2 (1 − (1 − π ′′)TE−1 + π ′′TE−1) as shown in step (2). This implies 12 (1 − (1 − π ′)TE + π ′TE ) <
1
2 (1 − (1 − π ′′)TE−1 + π ′′TE−1).
The same logic holds if TE is decreased by more than 1. The proof if the sender never stops
experimenting unsuccessfully before the increase of π is straightforward. 
Algorithm for the derivation of EUCt and TM
Define the continuation utility if the sender follows his optimal experimentation plan
and if the state is ω1 as EU
ω1
t = π + (1 − π )EUω1t+1 − cE . Analogously define EUω2t =
(1 − π )θ + πEUω2t+1 − cE in state ω2. We have EUωit = 0 for all t ≥ TE , as at all such t the
sender does not run further experiments. EUωit can be easily determined backwards starting at
TE (i.e., first determine it at TE , then at TE − 1, then at TE − 2...). The continuation utility in t
is then EUCt = μtEUω1t + (1 − μt )EUω2t .
For a type that manipulates, TM can be determined as follows. We have TM ≤ TE . First, form
the hypothesis that TM = T , with T = TE . Then, calculate the continuation utilities for all
t ≤ T from eventual manipulation given T . If “one stage deviations” at μt , that is, either ma-
nipulate at t or stop unsuccessfully at μt , are not profitable for all t ≤ T , then the hypothesis
is true. Otherwise, continue with the hypothesis that TM = T − 1, then TM = T − 2 and so on
until a hypothesis is true.
Proof of Proposition 2. (i) Table A1 shows that an increase of π may induce a switch from
eventual manipulation to experimentation with eventual unsuccessful stopping.
The sender does not want to run a second experiment after observing an adverse outcome
of the first experiment before and after the change of π . However, manipulating is just better
than stopping unsuccessfully after observing an adverse outcome with the initial π . If π in-
creases, then manipulating after observing an adverse outcome becomes worse than stopping
unsuccessfully at this history, as the posterior is now worse due to the higher informational
22 Note that the case is considered, where TE is finite and strictly greater than 0 before and after the change of
π . Hence, if we have TE = 1 before the change of π , then we have TE = 1 after the change of π . If TE = 1, then
prob{ai = ωi} = μ0(1 − (1 − π )) + (1 − μ0)π = π , which increases in π .
23 As (1 − (1 − π )TE ) increases in TE , and as πTE decreases in TE , the decision quality prob{ai = ωi} decreases in
TE for all μ0, if it decreases when the maximum weight μ0 = 1/2 is attached to (1 − (1 − π )TE ).
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Table A1
switch from experimentation with manipulation (part a) to experimentation without manipulation (part b) for
parameters μ0 = 0.3, cE = 0.24, θ = 0.5, and cM = 0.5775 in response to an increase of π
(A) π0 = 0.7 : t 0 1 (B) π1 = 0.71: t 0 1
μt 0.3 0.155 μt 0.3 0.149
EU1t 0.075 −0.005 EU1t 0.0745 −0.011
EUCt 0.075 0 EU
C
t 0.0745 0




optimal experimentation with TE = 7 for parameters π = 0.55, μ0 = 0.4, cE = 0.35, θ = 0.7, and cM = 0.75
t 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
μt 0.40 0.35 0.31 0.27 0.23 0.20 0.17 0.14
EU1t 0.059 0.048 0.038 0.028 0.019 0.011 0.004 −0.002
EUCt 0.099 0.078 0.059 0.042 0.026 0.013 0.004 0
EUMt 0.07 0.056 0.043 0.030 0.019 0.009 −0.000002 −0.008
Table A3
optimal manipulation for parameters π = 0.6, μ0 = 0.4, cE = 0.35, θ = 0.7, and cM = 0.75
t 0 1 2 3
μt 0.40 0.31 0.23 0.16
EU1t 0.058 0.028 0.003 −0.017
EUCt 0.074 0.030 0.003 0
EUMt 0.07 0.042 0.019 −0.001
value of the adverse outcome. At the prior, experimentation is sufficiently cheap such that
(before and after the change of π) the sender prefers to gamble by running an experiment
with a chance to obtain a positive outcome over obtaining a positive outcome with certainty
by expensive manipulation.
(ii) Table A2 shows that manipulation is not optimal for some parameters.
Table A3 shows that eventual manipulation is optimal where all parameters except π , which
is increased, are as in Table A2. 
Proof of Observation 2. The decision quality from eventual manipulation is prob{ai =
ωi} = μ0, as prob{m = s1 | ω = ω1} = 1 and prob{m = s1 | ω = ω2} = 0.
The decision quality from experimentation with eventual unsuccessful stopping is
prob{ai = ωi} = μ0(1 − (1 − π )TE ) + (1 − μ0)πTE .
We have μ0(1 − (1 − π )TE ) + (1 − μ0)πTE > μ0(1 − πTE ) + (1 − μ0)πTE = μ0 + πTE (1 −
2μ0), where the inequality holds as π > 1 − π .
Finally, we have μ0 ≤ μ0 + πTE (1 − 2μ0), where (1 − 2μ0) ≥ 0 due to μ0 ≤ 1/2, which con-
firms that experimentation with unsuccessful stopping yields a higher decision quality than
manipulation. 
Proof of Proposition 3. Suppose cM is sufficiently low such that after observing an ad-
verse outcome of an experiment with πE the sender prefers manipulation to stopping unsuc-
cessfully. The ex ante benefit from manipulation at the outset is then strictly greater than zero,
as the prior belief is more favorable. This ex ante benefit does not depend on π . Consider
an increase of π above πE . An increase of π is only possible if πE < 1. πE < 1 implies that
μ0π + (1 − μ0)(1 − π )θ − cE decreases in π and we have μ0π + (1 − μ0)(1 − π )θ − cE ≤ 0 if
π > πE . If π > πE , it follows that ex ante manipulation at the outset is strictly better for the
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sender than doing nothing, which is weakly better than running an experiment without ma-
nipulation. Regardless of whether manipulation at the outset or manipulation after observing
an adverse outcome is ex ante best for the sender at a π exceeding πE , the decision quality in
both cases is the same. Hence, we have πM ≤ πE .
This result does not depend on our assumption that θ ≥ 0. If θ < 0, then μ0π + (1 −
μ0)(1 − π )θ − cE increases in π . Analogous to above, we then have πE = 1 if μ0 ≥ cE (and no
experimentation occurs at any π if μ0 < cE). With manipulation, an increase of the face value
above πE = 1 is not possible and we have πM ≤ πE . Also note that for parameters excluded
by Assumption A, for which the sender prefers no experimentation to experimentation for all
π ∈ (1/2, 1], we cannot have that a change of the face value induces a switch away from ma-
nipulation. In these cases neither the benefit from no experimentation nor from manipulation
depend on π . 
Proof of Proposition 4. (i) Before the increase of π the sender experiments and after the
increase he does not experiment. We now show that prob{ai = ωi} decreases in π for these pa-
rameters.
Consider an increase of π and a sender that switches from a finite and strictly positive TE to
TE = 0. Consider the initial π . In this case prob{ai = ωi} = μ0(1 − (1 − π )TE ) + (1 − μ0)πTE .
Suppose π increases. Now the sender does not experiment and induces a = a2. Hence, we
have prob{ai = ωi} = μ0 ∗ 0 + (1 − μ0) ∗ 1 = (1 − μ0).
We have π ∈ (1/2, 1). Setting π = 1/2 yields (1 − μ0) > μ0(1 − (1 − π )TE ) + (1 − μ0)πTE
for any finite TE , with TE > 0. By continuity the inequality also holds for π greater but suffi-
ciently close to 1/2. Setting π = 1 yields (1 − μ0) < μ0(1 − (1 − π )TE ) + (1 − μ0)πTE . By con-
tinuity the inequality also holds for π smaller but sufficiently close to 1. We have that (1 − μ0)
is independent of π and, as shown in the proof of Lemma 2, we have that μ0(1 − (1 − π )TE ) +
(1 − μ0)πTE increases in π , which completes the proof.
(ii) After the increase of π the sender manipulates. As established in Observation 2,
prob{ai = ωi} decreases in π for these parameters. 
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